What is the role of Pentecostalism on College-bound Anglophone Africans in OECD countries?

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Abstract

Numerous studies have shown that the social background of a household may influence the social mobility of their children. What is less discussed is the role of religion as an important social origin and its influence on transnationalism. I study the role of identifying with Pentecostalism, in relation to other push factors on transnationalism in households with college-bound children (international and non-migrant). I paired college-ready migrants and non-migrants of similar cohorts in 3 Anglophone sub-Saharan African countries. I show that households that identify with Pentecostalism and associated with higher levels of education are more likely to have transnationals that are college-ready. It is very unlikely that the independent effect of Pentecostal religion is statistically important for international migration, though it may be salient cultural capital for households within the region. The study contributes to the mediating role of social origin and religious choices on transnationalism.

Keywords: Pentecostal Religion; College-Bound Student; Social Origin; International Migration.

1 Introduction

Pentecostalism is a religion that is historically known to be important for the social mobility of individuals and advancement in human societies. Writings by Weberian political sociologists have outlined the relationship between religion and society, and have argued that its ethos can influence openness and development (Bendix 1998; Nunziata & Rocco, 2018; Kanas, A., & Müller, K, 2021). These studies show that the Pentecostal religion has a strong link with the secular principles that promote development, globalization and transnationalism (Peggy Levitt, 2003; Dena Freeman. 2012). The reasons attributed include the religion's network structure, informational value and appeals to adherents to accept self-responsibility (Van Dijk, R. A.; 1997). Given this, is identifying with Pentecostal religion an important social origin for college-bound sub-Saharan African migrants in OECD countries? Is its effect on transnationalism systematically independent from its impact on households with no transnational migrant? Does parental education moderate the role of the Pentecostal religion of college-ready migrants? College-bound households refer to families with at least a child who has obtained a high school certificate or higher.

Why is Pentecostalism important to households seeking international migration in Anglophonic Africa? First, it is because it encourages liberal values and is less likely to have a restraining institutional structure – this has become attractive to young people (Menjivar, C. 1999). The continent's young population is likely to positively affect the proliferation of the Pentecostal religion - as technology and flair for modernity are important components of Anglophone Pentecostal churches - a feature often less found in other orthodox religions. For households seeking international migration, there is a contingent relationship between the demographic and modernity structure of Pentecostal churches and transnational migration. Carbone Giovanni argues that it is Africa's young population and the net effect of development that may have increased migration in the past decades rather than nationals seeking a European Eldorado. Second, which is also salient for international migration is that – the religion emphasises values of thrift and piety when members take on its belief (Marshall, R. 2009, Freeman, 2012). Last, Pentecostalism provides an opportunity to gain a new form of identity that can be strategically chosen when other social origins or social classes that are innate or indivisible such as ethnicity do not provide the required cultural capital. Authors have argued that children's life courses are largely determined by the social class of their parents (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Filmer and Pritchett 1999; Mein et al. 2020; Sabatier 2008; Stocke 2007).

In this regard, specific households may decide to join Pentecostal churches to harness a new form of capital. There is a need for a robust framework that

incorporates mediating and contextual drivers. This includes decomposing the effects of a household's religious choices on international migration (Van Hear, N., Bakewell, O., & Long, K; 2018) though Barro & McCleary (2003) argues authors should account for religiosity and the level of adherence. While Pentecostalism is described as rational and instrumental, it is important to mention that the religion is also known for its exploitative aspects which are less discussed in this paper.

Using survey data from 3 sub-Saharan African countries, we discuss the role of identifying with Pentecostal religion on international migration over often overstated economic drivers - particularly the role of social origin and social class. Social origin refers to the social resources intrinsic to households or the constraints that inhibit decisions that could improve their members' status including religion. Social class is indexed in this paper as a higher level of parental education.

Following the discussion above, we hypothesize that identifying with the Pentecostal religion has emerged as an important social origin and has become a significant positive predictor of transnational migration for college-bound migrants whose parents have at least a college degree. Though scholars believe that Pentecostalism promotes piety and discipline and may provide households with the information, motivation, networks and relational support (Berger, 2010), these impacts may be limited to education received locally and its specific role in transnationalism among migrant categories is yet to be explored. We argue that the Pentecostalism effect is moderated by higher levels of parental education. Households that only identify with the religion with a lower level of parental education are not likely to migrate into an OECD country. This shows that both the role of social class and social origin are intertwined. In this paper, improved social class refers to access to higher levels of education. Ann Swidler's (1986) seminal work has long identified the need to critically examine cultural components and "how" they are used to construct strategies of action. Household members can access social resources by their rational choices, through affinity with status-based groups. But does it eliminate the role of social class (higher levels of education)?

Our second hypothesis is that urbanization, often cited as a push factor, does not predict transnationalism for college-bound migrants. Though most international migrants in developing countries come from cities due to their higher concentration of educational infrastructures, there are mobility transitions that need to be considered (Lerch 2020). Although social institutions that promote education such as Pentecostalism are known as an urban phenomenon, there are transitions that can promote a rural resurgence (Alvarsson and Segato 2003). As societies reach advanced stages of urbanization,

emigration becomes less important and there is a spillover effect of urbanity in rural areas; this is termed the rural exodus. There has also been a rise of rural Pentecostalism in many areas of Africa and Latin America that has attracted members interested in combining modernity with traditional ways of life (Alves 2018; Chandler 2007). This suggests that the opportunity structure for international migration prospects can be achieved outside of cities. As a consequence, we expect that the information gap is a key measurement of the disparity between transnational and non-migrant which Pentecostalism often seeks to bridge (Ambler 1994). Households that specifically spend on information-seeking resources are more likely to be selected into international migration (Hypothesis 3).

Previous research has often agreed that transnational migrants are self-selected and have distinct social qualities that make them systematically different from similar cohorts (Borjas 1987; Feliciano 2005; Grabowska and Jastrzębowska 2019); the contextual and social origin effects of international migrants are still less studied. These prior studies have often explored this relationship in two dimensions. While the first dimension has been the focus of a number of studies that examine the distinctions between transnational migrants and the native populations of their destination countries, research concerning the second dimension seeks to explain the difference between migrants and stayers in their communities of origin. Studies on the second dimension are rare, and proponents have highlighted the need to explore both the heterogeneity and specificity of migrant groups (Gullick 1977; Hamilton and Huang 2020). What these papers show is that the socio-cultural context of households is important for selectivity into international migration. Another gap this paper fills is that we also don't know the specific role of each push factor of international migration that is independent of their impact prior to migration. For example, the effect of Pentecostalism on education prior to migration is independent of its effect on international education.

In this paper, we contribute to the insufficiently researched field on the contextual attainment and social origin of skilled sub-Saharan African migrants to the Global North around the turn of the 21st century, and we explore the role of social origins in promoting chances for selectivity. Such analysis can explain the displacement of other historically important social origins. Studies on the importance of habitus, social class or status can be inherently conflated and incoherent. In many cases, previous work has been less focused on these mechanisms and has indexed these social origins through generalized concepts rather than investigating the specific ways in which households make optimal decisions based on their available social resources. In African countries, the networks and information that promote social opportunities for households are likely sought through intermediary institutions such as religion. We use

matching to estimate these effects, an advanced statistical technique that accounts for differences between migrants and stayers in household samples in Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda.

2 Previous Research

2.1 *Pentecostalism and Education in Anglophone Africa*

Traditional theories of social mobility presuppose that parents' social and economic disadvantages can lead to the intergenerational transmission of inequality, and that disadvantaged households are deprived of educational opportunities. In Africa, Pentecostalism has been theorized as one of the means used to educate and civilize" parts of the continent'' because the religion can adapt to the changing social expectations in a globalized world. This was historically important to poorer regions in the continent – making it highly attractive to disadvantaged populations (Gilbert, J. 2015; Bangura, 2020). Historically, for example, the Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone, an Anglican missionary school created in 1827, often described as the Athens of Africa, promoted Christianity and education tangentially throughout the region – and was also affiliated with the Anglican missionary school in Durham University, England (1876– 1967). In Uganda for instance, the first missionaries arrived in 1877 and western Education became an integral part of the mission (David Scanlon, Education in Uganda: 1964). Religion was introduced to many parts of Africa by the colonialists as a way to socialize and educate the people(Stambach, A. 2009).

The Pentecostal religion often promises prosperity that is congruent with the failing financial realities of many African households who regard traditional beliefs as rigid and outdated (Freeman, 2012). Previous studies that often adopt Bourdieu's concepts of cultural capital, status passage and habitus argue that the mental schemes and disposition of specific households and the social group they belong to can make them better or less positioned to attain favorable status such as higher levels of education (Bommes and Kolb 2006; Nohl et al. 2006; Sezgin 2008).

Though Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda are multi-religious countries - it is important to stress that Pentecostalism (a modern offshoot of classical Protestantism) is a relatively new religion in these regions. Pentecostalism in West Africa is believed to exist within the same Protestant tradition and rhetorics. Adherents of classical Protestantism, who were often understood as

ascetic, mostly came to Pentecostalism (or new Pentecostalism) in the early 70s and 80s.

Pentecostals constitute a majority of the educated Christian groups and have become a dominant religion and social group in these regions. For example, in a 10-country survey by Pew Research, Nigerian Pentecostals are much more likely to have obtained at least some post-secondary education than educated Christians in the United States and Chile, where this faith is also practised (Pew Research, 2006). Nigeria is a country where Christians and Muslims have almost an equal share of the country's population, however, 61 percent of Muslim adults have no formal schooling compared to 26 percent of Christians. The reports also show that the education gap between Christian and Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa is among the largest intra-regional gaps in the world. The missionary activity had a positive long-term impact on educational attainment in most sub-Saharan African countries in relation to the Catholic missions - which was estimated to have a small and insignificant effect on education (Nunn et al.2014).

2.2 Pentecostalism and Internationalism.

Does identifying with Pentecostalism predict international migration (including international education) in similar ways by which it has influenced local education in sub-Saharan Africa? Given the relationship between Pentecostalism and education, we expect a strong and positive relationship between religion and selection into transnationalism for college-bound children seeking jobs or education in OECD countries. Nonetheless, this paper shows that by decomposing these effects, the role of parental education in moderating this effect is salient.

How then is Pentecostal religion different from other religions in Anglophone countries and what does this mean for international migration or openness to migrate? Different religious denominations generate different types of cultural capital required to promote openness and internationalism. A study by Daniel Joseph shows that moderate Protestant denominations (often referred to as Pentecostals in Anglophone African regions) are more cosmopolitan than other religions because they are less threatened by globalization. In the same line, Mehanna (2002) also finds that the nations with dominant faith as Pentecostalism are more open than countries whose dominant faith is Catholic or Muslim. In other regions, non-Pentecostal religions are known to promote economic performance such as the Jews in the United States (Barry R, 1981). Others have found orthodox religions such as Catholicism to be an important part of economic transitions (Barro et al).

In another paper, Christina Rocha found the influence of the Pentecostal megachurch on the influx of international South American Students living in Australia. She argued that the Pentecostal church (Hillsong church)'s youth culture and middle-class sensibility attract educated Brazilian nationals (Rocha, C; 2019). The church leverages the social anxiety of nationals and gives a liberal promise of hope, that a relationship with God can furnish them with a new identity and embodiment required to integrate into Australia.

Because Pentecostalism is likely to promote more openness and provide an alternative to other innate social origins, the self-selectivity of transnational migrants may make them affiliate with institutions that promote upward and social mobility giving adherents an edge over similar cohorts that are left-behind (Borjas 1987; Feliciano 2005; Grabowska and Jastrzębowska 2019). However, when those left-behind are also positively influenced by religion, it may need to be moderated by other factors that are influenced by the class structure.

Discussion on whether Islamic religion is correlated to economic growth and openness has often been divided because of the religion's reverence for distribution over growth (McCleary and Barro; 2004), while Hillman (2007) states it is due to the Islamic religion's reference to supreme values hereby placing lower priorities for pecuniary matters (Timur Kuran, 2003). Studies that focus on individual households rather than at the country-level claim that adherence to the Islamic religion is negatively correlated with social cohesion (Suryadarma, 2009).

We have expressed that generally, the Christian religion may provide a foundation for gaining social and cultural capital, and the effect can be understood when historical and social contexts are considered (Lindley 2002; Roth 2020). Pentecostal networks of allied members encourage each other to ignite their "spiritual gifts", pursue economic liberalism and individuality, and improve their social status (McCain 2013). Past research has considered what may be the push factors for transnational migration which are theorized to occur in three levels - the micro, meso and macro, with debates about which is more important. Micro, meso and macro refer to households, network capital and structural levellers respectively (C. Cummings, J. Pacitto, D. Lauro, M. Foresti; 2018). This paper mainly considers the micro-meso level interactions with religion playing an important role which is often less discussed. It is still commonplace that Pentecostalism is likely to promote piety, discipline and entrepreneurship that may be required for education and internationalism (Berger 2010).

The preference for internationalism and western education represents a point of analytical contrast between stayers and those who are "able" to migrate.

Historically, we see that it was triggered through experiences from colonial education that promoted the ideologies of western education. In sub-Saharan Africa, educated transnational migrants were historically and socially positioned as a leading class – ambitious to take up positions of influence within society. The bulk of the educated elite in these regions in the early 1900s (after the end of the slave trade) was made up of immigrants from the creole culture in Sierra Leone, where most freed slaves from West Africa were sent and retrained (Dixon-Fyle and Cole 2006; Smitherman 1986). This created opportunities for "a group of Africans" to have a confluence of cultures and ideas that also included those found locally. Many of these migrants shed the monotony of class and identity, preferring to be different from locals.

2.3 Is Positive Selection to International Migration Dependent on the Effect of a Household's Religion or Education?

It is not enough to believe that an affiliation with Pentecostalism can increase the chances of international migration if we do not examine how households interact with Pentecostal institutions. If households are not able to harness the resources or capital attributed to the religion, which I index by lack of access to higher levels of education, the potential benefit of the pentecostal religion may decline. Like traditional theories of social mobility, this paper critically examines the decision-making mechanisms of households (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Coleman 1988; Fasang et al. 2014) within the framework of religion. For instance, (Coleman 1988) argues that social capital should be perceived in its functional form and that "a given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others''. Traditionalists argue that specifically in the context of transnational migration, the main mechanisms are that highly educated parents have an advantage over other social classes because (1) they have a higher level of knowledge of transnational opportunities and (2) their intrinsic motivation to seek the best education for their children (Gerhards et al. 2017). These studies often adopt Bourdieu's concepts of status passage and habitus to support the claim that the mental schemes and disposition of specific households and social groups can make them better or less positioned to attain favourable educational status for their members (Bommes and Kolb 2006; Nohl et al. 2006; Sezgin 2008).

As discussed, we see that the Pentecostal religion may promote values and encourage members to engage in capitalist practices or be more open to migration. But information on programs on transnational migration (or education) is mainly sourced from the internet and networks. It is important to know how households choose to maximize this information and whether they have the social and economic resources to do so. The Breen–Goldthorpe (BG)

effect addresses class differences in patterns of educational decisions as a consequence of differences in households' resources and constraints. This argument asserts the need to use decomposition analysis to separate the effects of social origin from social class – even though it has also been established that one's social origin can potentially precede social class (Bukodi and Goldthorpe 2013; Stocke 2007). For instance, the advantage gained by a child from her parent's education might be referred to using the notion of class, but the class effect can be disaggregated and discussed in the context of the "ability" of the parents to use resources associated with the education they received and how that can "motivate" their children to achieve upward social mobility. This distinction is important for discussing (1) the capacity of social agents, (2) the contemporary relevance of agent's informational wealth (3) the contributory effect of dual agents (child and parent) (4) the deviation from any normative connotation of the relative importance of specific social origins. Studies on migrants and stayers require deliberation on the mechanism by which social origin increases the chances of selection. This can also lead to further analysis of the relative advantages of in-groups.

Pentecostal religion is known for its incessant organization of educational resources through programs, workshops and seminars on self-empowerment. Critics often refer to Pentecostal churches as "prosperity" churches. Members are encouraged to share and teach beneficial information promoting economic progress and education – which offers information premiums for international opportunities. They highly encourage members to acquire new skills and seek global influence – citing it as a core value of Christianity. But even when these churches distribute information to members, parents with lower levels of education may still not benefit. Portes and Hao (2004) provided some insights on the importance of reconsidering contextual effects. They suggested that the improved educational attainment of immigrant students compared to natives in the US is based on household reconstructions of common identity. Household choices and strategies are often based on rational choices, as decisions on networks are part of family migration "strategies" - and I argue that households that are able to maximize these effects are those with higher levels of education.

3 Data and Methods

Comparing households with migrants and non-migrants entails unique empirical challenges with regard to approximating the effect of social origin on educational migration. Most data available on migration is insufficient and does not capture household differences between migrant and non-migrant households within the same sample. Household surveys in sub-Saharan Africa

do not ask questions about international migration history. Yet, the Migration and Remittance Survey Household Survey conducted in 2009 and 2010, a cross-national survey in six African countries, captures the demography of educational migrants and non-migrant households within the same period. I use Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda because they are all Anglophone countries and also because they include questions on Pentecostalism. This is consistent with reports that most Africans travelled to study in these two countries in the early 21st century.

The data contains categories of non-migrants, internal migrants and international migrants. I compared the results from international migrants to the other two categories, which I refer to as non-migrants (which means non-international migrants or stayers). This means that stayers consisted of households of those who migrated internally to at least another village or an urban area for at least six months before the survey. This gives an average representation of the national average (excluding international migrants). Households with an international migrant have had at least one member abroad since January 1, 2000. The aim is to compare migrants' households with those of their cohorts in the same context, as previous studies have highlighted (Hamilton and Huang 2020).

3.2 Study Sample

The survey was done in 2009 with consideration of the demographic and political characteristics of the migrant sample. It involves a stage random sampling method. In the first stage, states were sampled and selected by migration incidence stratum – low and high. Results were also approximately weighted representing a very fair representation of states within these countries. Individual and household data were collected and grouped in different sources. The total sample size is 22,275 households.

I restricted my samples to respondents who reported to be parents of the migrant (father or mother of the migrants). I focused on migrants who travelled to 17 OECD/advanced countries[1] and their primary motivation for travelling was education and work. These two categories are often intertwined in literature and referred to as *labor migrants.* Though the sample is restricted to college-bound migrants, I disregarded other migrant types who have migrated for non-skills-related motives (e.g., family reunion).

[1] Countries include UK, USA, Belgium, Canada, Germany, France, Australia, Italy, UAE, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Norway, Holand, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden

There were a few missing values on the household attributes from the migrant's data which were only available in the individual data. Rather than dropping missing observations of continuous data, I set these observations to the covariate mean and create a separate variable for missingness on each covariate — thereby allowing me to match respondents on missingness as well as on the values taken by the covariates.

The data consists of household rural/urban settlement, the reason for migration, place of migration, education before migration, household head (or proxies) years of completed education, household access to assets, religion, expenditure on education, health, remittances and other variations across these variables. My dependent variable was a binary outcome of skilled transnational migrants vs. in-country migrants.

Only households with children above age 15 were allowed in the sample to ensure that households compared to have an adult who may or may not have migrated, making intuitive comparison possible.

3.3 Independent Variable

"Identifying with a religion" is the main independent variable - which is a factor level variable that includes its five main subdivisions in the three countries. This includes Islam, Catholic, Protestant, Pentecostal, Traditional and others. It was unclear the division between the Protestants and Pentecostals However, many Protestants in West Africa regard themselves as Protestants. Additionally, because the survey did not ask for religiosity, this paper focuses on identifying with the region and not the strength of such identity.

3.4 Control Variables

- **Ethnicity** also consists of the 26 main ethnic groups earlier identified in each[2].
- **Parental education** is a categorical variable that was coded as none, primary, secondary (high school), vocational, higher (which include college and higher degrees. Though Migration and Remittance Survey Household Survey data include questions on years of schooling (interval-level), I discounted this variable because there was a lot of missingness in the Kenyan data.
- **Household size** This data measures the number of current house members by excluding members not living within the home at the time of the survey including internal and international migrants. Large household sizes can

[2] Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo, Efik/Ibibio, Ijaw, Nupe, Bini/Esan, Acholi, Baganda, Bagisu, Bajuni, Bakonzo, Banyankole, Basoga, Iteso, Kamba, Kikuyu, Kisii, Kuku, Langi, Lugbara Luhy, Luo, maragoli, Nubian, Somali

be advantageous for families when they need to recycle educational resources and information for different children. In a recent study of 86 surveys from 34 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, researchers found a positive effect of family size on schooling, where families with 3+ children are relatively richer (Alidou and Verpoorten 2019).

- **Urban-rural residence**: Theories on contextual attainment and origin of migrants have focused on pre-migration residence. This variable was coded as a binary with 1 as urban, and 0 as rural.
- **Expenditure Utilities**: Household expenditure on utilities signals the "capacity" of a household in providing their members with electricity, water and other utilities which can be indexed for household wealth. To harmonize the monetary value across the 3 countries, I converted the value to USD in each country's exchange rate in 2009. A similar procedure was completed for all variables of monetary values in this paper.
- **Computer Expenditure**: this consists of the amount spent by the household on computer-related expenditures.
- **Education cohort**: cohorts with similar levels of education and gender in a given year.

3.5 Analytical Strategy

I examined the role of identifying with Pentecostal religion and parental education that influences selectivity into international migration. Using logistic regression, we identify the probability of the odds of being selected into OECD countries which are denoted by a binary outcome. I coded the predictors as binary variables. We presented four predictive models with two that used the matched data. This allows me to examine if variations in both groups are driven by households' cultural capital before migration or other non-social behaviours.

The first and the second model is based on the matched data which is the predicted probabilities from the vector of covariates of pairing households of similar education cohorts at the year of migration. The difference between the first and the second is that the first model does not include the interaction effect of religion and education which exposes the bias in estimating the moderating relationship between the two social factors. The third model includes the original data without matching. The fourth and final model test for households who have received no remittance using the unmatched data.

The first and second models produced the independent effects of each independent variable on transnationalism. These effects are independent of their pre-migration effects as we mainly compared two similar groups.

For the matching, we used the "greedy" algorithm, which goes through the potential matches and selects the closest unmatched observation. Though data was selected randomly, I tried to estimate the probability of selection not depending on potential outcomes and varying the unit of educated migrant selectivity to reflect randomness. The propensity score used was based on the estimation of variables that affected the outcomes but are independent of the responses from households selected into international education. This preprocessing allows for the similarity between the migrants and stayers. Since this is an observational study, we cannot isolate the social origin-based differences from all observed and unobserved pre-existing differences, rather I controlled for all possible variables following instituted matching methods (Olmuş, H. et al2019).

After matching, β is the effect of individual religion. σ is a categorical term that expresses the effect of all ethnicities, and Hausa ethnicity as the base category (which is one of the least educated groups in the region). This is similar to ɤwhere a rural residence is the reference category. α , μ and δ are the effects of parental education, vector of other household properties and education cohorts respectively. The main effect of interest is υ, which is the interaction of Parental education and religion. E is the error term.

The main model is defined as:

$$\text{EduMigrant} = \text{Religion}\beta + \text{Ethnicity}\,\sigma + \text{Urban}\,ɤ +$$
$$\text{ParenEdu}\alpha + \text{ParenEdu}^{*}\,\text{Religion}\,\upsilon + \text{HHOrigin}\,\mu + \text{EduCohort}\,\delta + \text{E}\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots(1)$$

We used logistic regression to determine the odds of selection and converted them to probabilities using (odds/(1-odds)). The analysis includes the pretreatment variables stated above, and the country-fixed effect. We centred the variables so that the predictors have mean 0. This makes it easier to interpret the intercept term and coefficients as the expected value of Yi when the predictor values are set to their means.

3.6 Decomposing the Effect of Pentecostalism on International Migration

Determining a control group that is similar to transnational migrants poses an empirical challenge. Because Pentecostalism is likely to influence both local and international education in the same way, it is important to delimit the effect of Pentecostalism on transnational education that is independent of its effect on

local education. We overcome this with a crude method by ensuring that the final sample consists of two household groups that are matched by the migrants' and non-migrants levels of education at the time of migration time. In other words, we compare households of transnational migrants with households of non-migrants with the same level of education and gender in a given year (where the year was the year of migration). For example, if a female migrant's level of education was "secondary school" at the time of migration say "3 years ago"; the female migrant is matched with another non-migrant with a similar level of education and gender at the same time. We achieve this through exact matching which also considers the probability of the distribution of each education cohort in the full sample before matching. We refer to this new variable as "education cohort" which can simply be defined as cohorts with similar levels of education in a given year. This variable was coded from the question "what is the highest level of education before migration" which was asked by both transnational migrants and internal migrants. This means that households that had no migrants are excluded from the matched sample. This also ensured that they compare two similar groups because households that have no member migrating for educational purposes are very dissimilar from other groups. Non-migrants in this paper refer to those who still migrate to either rural or urban areas for schooling (internal migrants).

The advantage of the period-cohort models is that it disentangles the changing effects of cohort size on educational and employment outcomes that may otherwise bias the findings (Easterlin, Richard A. 1987; Tenn, Steven. 2005; Horowitz Jonathan 2018). Its advantages are as follows. The challenge with this resolution is that first, comparing different cohorts does not control the effect of the relative education received by each cohort and the structure of labor market structure at the time of migration. Second, accounting for the effect of transnational migrant and non-migrant households that are similar by their child's highest level of education in the same (migration) year is likely to produce a similar Pentecostal effect for both groups. As mentioned earlier, we addressed this in two ways. (1). I created an education cohort variable and (2) tested the model with a separate sample that included college-bound households that were similar in the migrant's year of migration. Though both migrants' and non-migrants households may still be systematically different at the period the data was collected, which is a few years after migration, this method increases the chances that we estimate the effect of Pentecostalism beyond its effect on local education.

Finally, we focused mainly on college-bound households for both groups. By this, we mean only households with at least a child with a college degree or higher are included. The reason is that any positive or negative effect attributable to Pentecostalism or any other social origin on education will be

similar for the two groups before migration as they are similar in terms of their educational achievements in the year on or before migration. At this period, migrants would still be referred to as non-migrants and the factors influencing educational achievements or selectivity for both groups are likely to be similar After controlling for the education cohort effect at the year of migration, if Pentecostalism has any effect on the households on transnational households in a way that is dissimilar to non-migrants households that are similar them before migration, the Pentecostal effect on transnationalism is decomposed.

4 Results

4.2 Descriptive Statistics

In this section, we present the summary statistics among households with college-ready transnationals and non-migrants. Again, college-bound refers to households with children that have a minimum of high-school degree at the time the transnational migrated. we present the result of both the samples which are before and after matching with education cohorts by gender. We do not present the result in the matched sample because the trend was similar.

Table 1 shows that Pentecostal religion is the most popular religion among both transnational (48 %) and non-migrant households (63.3%), followed very closely by transnational Catholics (38.7 %) and non-migrants Catholic (23.2%) respectively These results show that there were more transnational Catholics among Catholics and less transnational Pentecostals among Pentecostals. This means that Pentecostalism may be positively associated with education for non-migrants as well as transnationals. This adduces the importance of matching the sample to consist mainly of education cohorts by age and gender- as it became obvious there were more Pentecostals among non-migrants than Pentecostals among transnationals. Generally, Pentecostalism is a dominant religion among college-bound households in these three countries.

In a bid to further assess the impact of household economic well-being on migrants' selectivity and their ability to act on migration choices, we explore household expenditure on education, utilities and information-seeking assets (computers). In both samples, transnational households spend more on education than non-migrant households. For example, transnational households spend on average $597.6 on education in 6 months, which is about a quarter of what a non-migrant household spends ($449.5) which is a percentage difference of 24.7 %. The difference between the two households' expenditure on utilities is significantly larger with about 360% difference. Transnational households spend an average sum of $600.5 on utilities in six months while non-migrant households spend $130.6.

We do not control for remittances to avoid controlling for post-treatment variables (though had a different model on that), but we show how both household types are different by the remittances they receive. It was expected that transnational households are likely to receive higher remittances than non-transnational families. While the average yearly remittances for non-migrants in the three countries combined was $454.9 in 2009, transnational households received on average $2,290.8. This result shows that remittances might have a strong financial impact on a household's economic resources after a long period of the transnational migration of a household member but there is no intuitive explanation as to why this may affect their religion, ethnicity and the education of parents which is paper we argue are strong predictors.

Results also show that there were more college-bound migrants with parents with at least a college degree than non-migrant householders. About a third (34.7%) of parents of college-bound transnationals have at least a college degree compared to 7.7 percent in non-migrants households. This clearly shows that transnationalism among college-bound migrants is highly influenced by the college education of their parents.

The ratio of non-migrant parents that have attained a high school education is similar to transnational parents – 28.2% and 26.7 % respectively. Non-migrants with college-bound students are likely to obtain a high school education in the same proportion as those with transnationals even though on average transnational parents obtain higher education than them. This follows the theory that first-generation students (students without parents with the educational certificate they intend to get) are less likely to complete it than those whose parents have received it. (Choy 2001; Ishitani 2006; Pascarella et al. 2004; Stephens et al. 2012; Woosley and Shepler 2011).

There is an indication from the results that the transnational status of college-bound migrants can be gendered. There were more men migrants (72.2%) in households with transnationals than women migrants (27.8%). I observed that among non-migrants with men (65%) was also higher than (35%) for women. This result shows that the proportion of transnational households with a college-bound woman decreases by 7.2 per cent (from 35% to 27.8%).

Pairing similar education cohorts by gender

The main question this paper attempts to answer is whether Pentecostalism promotes international migration for college-bound children beyond the religion's influence on similar households in sub-Saharan Africa. From the preliminary result, we can observe that transnational migrants are likely to have more education than non-migrant at the time of migration. The challenge is

that if we compare a transnational household with a higher-level educated migrant (e.g., college education) with a non-migrant household with a high-school educated non-migrant, we run into the problem of estimating the effect of Pentecostalism on the education received locally before migration. This is because Pentecostalism and other social origins are likely to influence the chances of African nationals receiving higher or lower levels of education. Also, if we compare a transnational household that left at period A with another that left at period B, then the difference may be due to the time effect. Because we use longitudinal data, it is important to compare cohorts that are similar by education and period.

The result shows that before matching, there were more households with migrants that are highly educated (33%) than non-migrants which was 13%. In Table 2, we see the results of the matching procedure that paired similar education cohorts in both groups. After matching, it shows for example that we compare households with transnational A, a man, with high school education who migrated to the US in Year C with households of non-migrants B, a man, with high school education that did not migrate to the US in the same Year C.

Where do College-Bound Pentecostals live in Sub-Saharan Africa?

As we have argued in the preceding session and shown in the findings above, households who identify as Pentecostals are the dominant religion among college-bound households. Cleary, one will expect that more transnationals have their families reside in urban areas, but if there were more Pentecostals in the rural areas, it may mean that Pentecostals households have a significant positive effect on the migration of college-bound students to the OECD countries in a way that is similar to households in urban settlements. This is in line with my third hypothesis that households with college-bound children are less likely to reside in urban areas, because of the influence of specific social origin that enables them to navigate intergenerational mobility beyond class. However, household choices interplay with their inherent class structure - as class indexed by parental education still have a strong mediating role.

In all three countries, Islamic adherents who have college-bound children live mostly in urban areas. This follows the argument that on average, the Islamic religion is not positively associated with education and we are only likely to find households with children that have a high school education in the urban areas. Contrarily, we observe that college-bound Pentecostal households reside mostly in rural areas in Kenya and Uganda. In Nigeria, most Pentecostals with college-bound children live in urban areas. This could mean there are Pentecostal churches in rural Nigeria that may have different orientations from those in the urban area, and also because the social and economic differences

between rural and urban Nigeria are distinct from those found in Kenya and Uganda.

Interestingly, the Catholics have a similar sample of college-bound households in both rural and urban areas in all three countries. The historical and contemporary relevance of the Catholic religion in this subcontinent allows it to have a stronghold across different regions.

5 Results

We present the result of the main findings for the four models in Table 3. We start with the first model that does not consider the moderation effect of parental education and Pentecostal religion. Model 1 and 2 were analyzed using the matched sample – again these are samples that consist of pairing education cohorts (of migrants and stayers) during the migrant's exit year by gender and education. Here we assume that identifying with the Pentecostal religion does not change by the level of parental education.

In Table 3, the independent model (model 1), we see that there is a positive relationship between households with transnational migrants and those that identify with the Pentecostal religion. Households who identify with the Pentecostal religion are 59 percent (odds ratio converted into probabilities) more likely to be selected into international migration but the result is not statistically after controlling for parental education, ethnicity and other covariates. Households with college-bound child(ren) who identify with the Catholic religion have a relatively higher probability of migrating to OECD countries - with results statistically significant. This preliminary result shows that both religions are positively associated but the Catholic religion is less likely to happen by random chance at 5% significance level. As expected, this result was different when we estimated the moderating role of parental education on the maximization of values and opportunities within each religion. The assumption that religion or parental education alone has an independent positive effect on international migration may be misconstrued.

In all models, higher levels of parental education are negatively associated with international migration. This means that the effect of having at least a parent with a college education and above does not predict whether a college-ready child will migrate to an OECD country with results statistically significant in models 1 and 2. The result shows that parental educational attainment may matter for local education but does not matter for transnationalism for college-ready children. It is important to note that these are the pre-matching results of models 3 and 4 which will be discussed later. Previous studies

(Feliciano and Lanuza 2017), found that the parents of those who migrate tend to be more educated than their non-migrating counterparts without examining decomposing these effects.

Using the matched sample, we reconsidered the main findings that include the interaction between parental education and religion - in the matched model 2 in Table 3. In this instance, the margins of identifying with Pentecostal households increased significantly - with the predicted probabilities estimated at 51 percent [3]. We did not find any positive effect of parents below college level of education on international migration. It is interesting that the interacting effect of social class (higher level of parental education) and religion (often based on rational choices) increases the chances of selecting into transnational education – which may not be attributable to the individual effect of these important social factors independently. We considered testing the interaction effect on the unmatched data which is model 3, the results were similar except that Catholic households were not statistically significant.

It is important to point out that in all three models the individual effect of belonging to Pentecostal households was negative, unlike the Catholic households. This clearly shows we only find a positive effect of Pentecostalism when parental education is considered. This indicates that (1) Pentecostalism, unlike other religions is highly associated with higher parent educational levels but when it is defined with households with lower-level education, its informational value may deplete. (2) Furtherance to the previous point, it is important for future research to consider possible two strands of Pentecostals which may include the highly-educated and lowly-educated with potential heterogeneity in social outcomes. The same might not be attributed to Catholicism whose doctrine and institutional structure are likely to be the same across social classes.

We reconstructed the reference category of religion to contrast households that identify with the Pentecostal religion with other religions (including Catholics). This is important because the initial reference category (Islam) has few people in the sample and also because we wanted to focus on the independent effect of affiliations with Pentecostal households and their interactions. Results in Table 3, Model 5 shows that households that associate with Pentecostalism are not a positive predictor of international migration if households associated with Catholicism are included in the reference category. This means that in societies where there are Catholics as shown in Table 3, the Pentecostal effect is less pronounced. However Table 3 shows that households that associate with Pentecostal religion with higher parental education (above college) are more

[3] exp(2.549-2.336-0.154)/(1+exp(2.549-2.336-0.154))

probable to migrate internationally - even when Catholic households are included in the reference category - but results are only significant at 17% level.

As another robustness check, we restricted the sample to households who have not received remittances in the past 12 months indexing with the no-remittance model(model 4). The model tests whether post-treatment bias may have occurred due to transnational migration. This bias precludes the likelihood that a household's income and choices could have increased for families that received them. Because we study a household's social origin, we expect that the effect of these factors is unlikely to change over time. Nonetheless, constructing this new model using the unmatched sample may strengthen the result. We find similar results with model 2 which is that Pentecostal households with higher levels of education are positively associated with international migration. Because this group who does not receive remittances are less likely to be a random group, the effect sizes were analyzed with caution. However, this clearly shows that the pattern in which higher levels of education and Pentecostalism interact may be consistent.

From the result of Model 2 in the matched data, we found that no ethnic group except the Baganda and Langi ethnic groups in Uganda is positively associated with transnationalism. The Baganda ethnic group is the largest ethnic group in Uganda and early missionary education was concentrated in this region. This result shows that ethnicity, an important cultural capital for education and migration in sub-Saharan Africa, is a weak predictor of transnationalism for college-bound students in OECD countries except in Uganda. The reason for this is not so clear. It is important to note that both the Baganda and Langi ethnic groups have historically had a high influence on migration and education within Uganda. For example, Baganda was a major town influenced by the Christian Missionary Society of British colonialism in 1876. In Nigeria, the dominant ethnic group, Hausa, is not historically associated with Christianity

From here, we assess the urban-residence paradox. Urban as a determinant of transnationalism – basically the idea that households with college-ready students in urban areas may have more transnational opportunities. In model 3 and 4 that does not consider pairs of cohorts that are similar by education and gender, we find that urban residence is an important predictor of transnationalism – the probability for households to send their high-school-educated children to an OECD country increases by 39.9 per cent. We argue that these models only provide us with the pre-treatment effect of urban residency that does not predict transnational migration. Also, households in urban areas are likely to have children with higher levels of education. But when we compare households with college-ready children that are similar in education, we find that urban settlement does not predict international

migration for these households through urban settlements is often associated with progress. The findings further strengthen the need for a contextual analysis of sending countries and variations across locations (Feliciano 2005).

The urban residence paradox has a number of implications. First, it might imply that transnational opportunities do not centre on urban areas and that tertiary educational attainment is not positively correlated with residence. Second, it also implies that the Pentecostal religion can replace the economic advantage often attributed to urban settlement. International education is believed to be dominated by those in richer opportunity structures, which is descriptively relevant. However, the higher population in urban areas might also reduce the average chance of selection into the very few international opportunities. Lastly, the chances of selection into migration are highly dependent on information in the modern age which is increasingly accessed to rural Households - sourced by children themselves, their educated parents, premium schools in remote areas or rural Pentecostal churches. This propels the possibility that families in poorer regions may also compete with those in richer households for similar foreign opportunities - also because households with educated parents can often crowdfund the high foreign travel fees when members are deciding to seek foreign jobs or educational institutions.

There is a significant and strong positive effect on investment in information assets (computers) across all models. The more a household spends on computer-related expenses, the probability of being selected into foreign schools increases by 89 percent (Hypothesis 3 in model 2). More broadly, the effect of informational opportunities in households and in external resources are very important resources. This implies that households who send their college-ready children abroad maximize information strategies more than non-migrants. Additionally, it suggests that the differentials and selectivity of migrants can be explained by information-seeking resources and the number of information resources acquired by migrants' parents.

Also worth noting is the result about whether family size does predict international migration for families with college-ready children. The result aligns with previous studies that show that larger households where material resources such as computers etc. that may be shared by children are positively correlated with social mobility (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009; Steelman et al., 2002; Alidou and Verpoorten 2019) – more important for a household with college-bound children.

6 Conclusion

The main finding in this paper can be summarized as an empirical discussion on the importance of considering religion as an informational residual in

estimating the effect of transnationalism for college-ready students. Despite the likely positive effect of identifying with the Pentecostal religion on education in general, its effect on college-bound migrants who have higher levels of educational needs is less discussed. What is important for education received locally prior to migration may be independent of what is required to migrate to an OECD country. While we find that higher levels of parental education and identifying with Pentecostalism are important for education in the local context, their individual effects do not predict international education. We overcome this hurdle by pairing households with the same level of education and gender at the time of transnational migration. We show that the chances that college-ready students will be selected for transnationalism from an Anglophone African country increase by 93 percent only for parents with a higher level of education (college and education beyond high school), the effect turns negative in interactions of Pentecostal religion and higher levels of parental education.

This study has four major contributions that further advance the theoretical understanding of migrants' selectivity on international migration, specifically college-ready students. First, this study pioneers the impact of Pentecostalism on international migration in Africa with a focus on effects that are independent of the pre-migration experiences. Second, the contexts from which the majority of highly skilled Africans in OECD countries originate have largely been highly understudied, and we adopted three sub-Saharan African countries as an important case study covering. Nigeria for example is the origin country of about forty percent of Africans who migrate to school in the United States each year. Third, the study explores the importance of the interaction of household choices (religion) and social class (higher levels of education)- and examines its influence on selectivity into international migration. The importance of these institutions is intensified due to the strong cultural wealth in education within these communities. While Pentecostalism is described in the paper as rational, instrumental, and one-dimensional opportunists, the portrayal of the religion and those who identify as Pentecostal Christian, the religion is also widely known for its exploitative aspects and corruption among pastors. Finally, in line with other research, this study shows that Pentecostalism may be attractive to marginalized groups in West Africa and that the discussion of the effect of religion on education and transnational migration may not be dominated by activities in urban areas and cities (Gilbert, J., 2015).

This paper addresses the social origins that influence selection into transnational education using OECD destinations. It is important to address the main limitations inherent in the discussion. First, the median number of years spent by educational migrants in 2009, as analyzed from the representative sample, is four years. As an approximate measure, we compared the household properties of both groups four years after their child left for university abroad,

which can be regarded as post-migration data. We expect that migrants' household resources and behaviours due to remittances as full-time students will not have changed significantly in these four years (2004–2008). There are also no recorded significant macroeconomic changes that improved the lives of stayers within this period. Nonetheless, any such occurrences might impinge on the estimation of the effect. Second, future research with a higher sample size might add more robustness to the results. Last, it could be argued that there are a number of educated migrants that are politically selected and sponsored by their state governments. Nonetheless, the Institute of International Education reports that only 4 percent of those studying in the United States were primarily sponsored by their national government in 2010, and 66.9 percent of them were financed by themselves or their families. Studies show that 61 percent of sub-Saharan Africans who took the decision to study in the United States obtained information from their friends and fellow students, and as mentioned earlier, 71 percent used the internet in their home country.

It is important to highlight that the mechanism by which social origin influences transnational education includes other social elements. While broad theories on education highlight the importance of household social resources, international education represents a greater financial and heuristic demand on households than local education. Despite the proliferation of Pentecostal religion in Anglophone Africa, social class (higher levels of education) still plays a role in selection into transnational education.

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APPENDIX

Table 4 Summary Statistics of College-Bound Transnational Migrants to Non- Migrants of Anglophone Sub-Saharan Nationals (Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda)

Variables	Levels	Non-Migrants	Transnationals	p-value
Residence	Rural	84 (26.0)	95 (29.4)	0.379
	Urban	239 (74.0)	228 (70.6)	
Marital status	Others	4 (1.2)	0 (0.0)	0.009
	Single/never married	53 (16.4)	55 (17.0)	
	Separated	3 (0.9)	2 (0.6)	
	Widowed	19 (5.9)	17 (5.3)	
	Divorced	2 (0.6)	16 (5.0)	
	Married	242 (74.9)	233 (72.1)	
Religion	Islam	63 (19.5)	35 (10.8)	<0.001
	Catholic	82 (25.4)	127 (39.3)	
	Others	6 (1.9)	3 (0.9)	
	Pentecostals	172 (53.3)	158 (48.9)	
Parent Highest Schooling	None	45 (13.9)	41 (12.7)	0.011
	Primary	68 (21.1)	58 (18.0)	
	Secondary	125 (38.7)	98 (30.3)	
	Vocational	13 (4.0)	14 (4.3)	
	Higher	72 (22.3)	112 (34.7)	
Send Remittances	No	166 (51.4)	98 (30.3)	<0.001
	Yes	157 (48.6)	225 (69.7)	
HH Size	Mean (SD)	5.3 (2.7)	5.0 (2.2)	0.116
Exp on Computer	Mean (SD)	26.3 (31.3)	42.0 (55.1)	0.258
Sex of Migrants	Female MigrantHH	89 (27.6)	89 (27.6)	1.000
	Male MigrantHH	234 (72.4)	234 (72.4)	
Remittances in past 12months	Mean (SD)	664.2 (2080.0)	2406.9 (8268.5)	<0.001
Exp on Education	Mean (SD)	495.1 (728.9)	583.5 (627.4)	<0.001
Exp on Utilities	Mean (SD)	85.3 (94.9)	487.7 (826.8)	<0.001
Highest School Before Migration	Higher	107 (33.1)	106 (32.8)	1.000
	Secondary	216 (66.9)	217 (67.2)	
	Vocational			


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